This paper examines the strategic dynamics of soybean trade between the United States and China through a static Nash Equilibrium (NE) framework. Using data from 2008 to 2023 on trade volumes and world soybean prices, we estimate a multivariate regression linking global prices to the import and export behavior of major countries. The estimated elasticities show that China’s imports significantly raise world prices, while U.S. exports exert a strong downward pressure. Based on these relationships, we construct a payoff matrix and identify the equilibrium strategies of both nations. The model predicts that, absent strategic motives, China would import a low volume while the U.S. would export heavily—contradicting observed behavior. To reconcile this gap, we introduce a “strategic benefit” term for China, reflecting food security, forest protection, and long-term supply stability. Incorporating this factor shifts the NE to one consistent with reality: China maintains high imports while the U.S. limits exports. The results highlight that global agricultural trade cannot be explained by price mechanisms alone; strategic and policy considerations play a decisive role. Our findings underscore the importance of integrating security-oriented objectives into economic models of international commodity trade.
Research Article
Open Access