

The Economics of Hosting Sports Events: Global Mega-Events and China's Village BA

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Abstract. Large amounts of public and private money go into professional sports and into major sporting events, and the spenders usually believe it is worth it in economic terms. Two ways of hosting sport are compared in this paper in order to check that belief. In the first, the mega-event model of the Super Bowl, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup and the Olympic Games, the host city pays for stadiums, security, transport and other infrastructure, and leagues, federations, broadcasters and outside businesses collect most of the income. According to economic studies and published host-city budgets, costs exceed the budget nearly every time, the jobs created are temporary and mostly filled by outsiders, ordinary tourists stay away because of crowding and higher prices, and the venues built for the event are little used once it ends. In the second, the grassroots model of Village BA, a village-run basketball tournament in Taijiang County, Guizhou Province, China, the games are played on existing open-air courts, entry is free, volunteers run the event, and income from licensing, stalls, parking and agricultural products stays with the village collective. The figures reported for the county and for the village show more tourists, higher collective and household income, migrant workers returning home and better local governance. The comparison suggests that how much is spent has little to do with the economic and social value of sport, and that small events owned locally are a lower-risk and more inclusive way to develop.

Keywords: sports economics, mega-events, cost-benefit analysis, grassroots sports, Village BA

1. Introduction

In every era and every place, societies have valued cultural expressions such as art, music and literature. The Italian Renaissance is one example; it was a golden age for art, and this happened only because people from all parts of society saw the value of art and paid for it. Vienna is another example; the city is famous all over the world as a center of music, and musicians there could create and perform freely due to long-term support from every level of society. In both cases, private donors and government funding were combined to keep these cultural activities alive, and this demonstrates how much such activities matter for social and cultural life.

The same tradition of valuing and supporting things that matter in culture also applies to sports. Cities and their fans have a strong passion for their local sports teams; this commitment can be seen in the money that public and private groups spend on them, in particular on building stadiums and on continuous support for professional teams. The parallel between sports, art and music leads to the following questions: the first is whether the widespread financial and social support for sports teams and events is financially viable. The second is whether it brings a social and cultural benefit that is worthwhile no matter what the economic result is.

Most people pay attention to large-scale events such as the World's Fair, the Olympics and the World Cup; however, these are not the only way in which cultural and sports activities shape culture. Smaller events, for example street fairs, local concerts and theatre, also have a positive effect on society. The same holds in sports, and local youth teams and less formal competitions can be an important part of daily life in neighborhoods and small towns. Therefore, such smaller events, and local and regional basketball tournaments in particular, will be discussed in this paper as a more natural and accessible way for sports to become part of daily social life. When both elite global tournaments and community-level grassroots games are examined, the economic and social role of sports in modern society comes out more fully.

The clearest case is "Village BA", the grassroots basketball movement in China. It began in small towns in Guizhou, and within a few years these competitions, run by the communities for themselves, had become hugely popular, with thousands of local people watching and the national media reporting on them. Nobody from a professional league is involved; the residents organize the games, the courts are outdoors, and volunteers, not corporate sponsors, keep them going. There is no stadium costing millions of dollars and no costly broadcast deal, and still the social benefit is large: neighbors know each other better, restaurants, homestays and other small businesses earn from the visitors, and young people have a place to play. Therefore, the contrast with the expensive mega-event is sharp, and it shows that sport can prosper without big public spending.

2. General discussion of costs and benefits of sports and hosting events

All over the world, cities and governments continue to put huge amounts of public and private money into the hosting of top-level sports events and the building of sports facilities. They usually present these investments as a way to promote economic growth, build community pride and gain more global attention. However, when the publicity is set aside and one checks the actual results, a clear pattern appears: the costs of supporting professional sports and hosting major events are almost always higher than the measurable economic benefits. The gains are a separate matter. Private leagues, broadcasters and businesses from outside the area usually take them, and the local people who live there do not. The same pattern can be seen in the Super Bowl, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) World Cup and the Olympic Games, which are three of the largest parts of modern sports hosting.

The hosting of the Super Bowl is promoted as a considerable financial gain for the host city; however, independent research shows that these economic benefits are often exaggerated. According to some estimates, total revenues can reach as much as \$1.3 billion. In practice, after all the costs and the money that leaks out of the local area are subtracted, the net income of local residents is only about \$150 million on average [1]. Most of the profits from the event go directly to the National Football League. It takes 100% of ticket sales as well as huge sums from merchandise and the multi-billion-dollar TV deals [2].

Almost all of the actual costs fall on the host cities, and public money pays for items such as additional security and infrastructure upgrades. For example, the 2015 Super Bowl in Glendale,

Arizona cost the city between \$579,000 and \$1.2 million in direct public expenses; Allegiant Stadium in Las Vegas, the host of the 2024 Super Bowl, received at least \$750 million in public funding [2]. Many of the local benefits are also overestimated, since temporary jobs in hotels and event management often go to outsiders instead of residents of the host city. Research on major sporting events has shown that local unemployed residents get only a small share of the temporary event jobs, and existing workers or outside staff fill most of the positions [3]. In addition, the rush of spectators who book rooms often drives regular tourists away, and this hidden cost is often ignored. For instance, hotel demand during the Super Bowl displaces regular leisure and business travelers; thus, local businesses lose non-event tourism income.

Using public money to build, renovate or maintain professional stadiums is one of the main ways in which cities support their sports teams. These projects are presented to the public as a way to promote neighborhood development, create jobs and bring long-term economic activity; in reality, the benefit is much smaller. A great deal of upfront funding is needed to build a stadium, and decades of maintenance costs follow; these become a long-term burden for local governments [4]. Their ability to bring steady local growth, however, is rather limited. Most professional stadiums stay empty for a large part of the year, so taxpayers do not get consistent economic returns from them. The financial benefits go mostly to private team owners. They obtain state-of-the-art facilities without paying the full cost, and the tax bill is left to local residents [5]. In many cases, stadium development displaces local communities and small businesses rather than helping them. In short, public money is turned into private profit.

Subsidies for local sports teams are not the only way in which cities and countries carry the financial burden of supporting sports. Competition is also strong in the bidding for large scale athletic events such as the Super Bowl and the Olympics. How host governments take on the burden of hosting and supporting sporting events can be seen in the FIFA World Cup. FIFA's hosting requirements state that at least fourteen suitable stadiums and enough hotel accommodation must be provided by the host country to meet tournament standards, and operational and fiscal support must be guaranteed by the government [6]. Like the Olympics, the FIFA World Cup makes host countries spend a great deal of money on this kind of infrastructure. The event receives much global attention and a short burst of tourist activity, but these benefits rarely cover the crippling costs, especially for developing economies. To build the facilities, host nations often go into heavy debt, and once the tournament is over these facilities stay vacant or are hardly used.

Tourism and employment pick up for a short time and then fall back. In addition, promised long-term gains, for example improved public transit or sports facilities for the community, often remain unfinished or never arrive. When costs overrun, local taxpayers and residents cover them, and FIFA together with the large corporate sponsors collects the bulk of the event's income. The economic case for hosting the World Cup, as for other mega-events, is built on hopeful assumptions instead of on results that can be measured and repeated.

The Olympic Games may be the most extreme case of cost-benefit imbalance in sports hosting. Every Olympics since 1960 has gone over budget, and the average cost overrun is 172% [7]. Total spending often reaches tens of billions of dollars on general infrastructure, specialized sports venues and operational costs, and most of it is paid by taxpayers. For example, at least \$9.7 billion was spent on Paris 2024, Sochi 2014 set a record at \$50 billion, and \$42 billion was spent on Beijing 2008, and local residents saw minimal measurable economic returns [3]. Eventually, hardly any economic return is left to show for all of this expenditure.

Figure 1 shows these rising costs. Before 1976, there was little or no growth in the cost of hosting the Summer Olympics. After that, expenses started to climb, and they peaked with a huge jump at

the Beijing games in 2008. That peak turned out to be extreme and costs have come down since then; however, they are still far above the pre-1976 levels.




Figure 1. Total cost of hosting the Summer Olympic Games by year, in millions of dollars

The relationship between the cost of hosting the Olympics and the number of bids is more complicated than it initially looks. The number of bids received for each Summer Olympic Games is shown in Figure 2. The cost of hosting the Summer Olympics rose sharply in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, but the number of bids did not fall steadily as costs went up. In fact, bidding became active again around the 1990s and stayed relatively high through the early 2000s, and it only declined after 2004. Based on the data, the correlation between the number of bids and hosting cost is positive, about 0.59 when the period back to 1900 is used and 0.64 for the period since 1960 (both figures include the 2028 and 2032 Games). Thus, higher costs did not stop cities from bidding. Many cities may instead have believed that they could control expenses better than previous hosts, or that tourism, international exposure, infrastructure investment and other expected revenues would be enough to justify the rising costs.




Figure 2. Number of bids received for each Summer Olympic Games by year

However, this does not mean that hosting the Olympics is necessarily good for the economy. The willingness of cities to bid may show optimistic expectations and not the real financial result of hosting. As discussed above, Olympic host cities often face severe budget overruns; at the same time, short-term tourism gains can be outweighed by overcrowding, high prices, security concerns and the displacement of regular visitors. Therefore, the positive relationship between bids and costs may point to an important difference between the benefits expected before hosting and the benefits realized after hosting. Cities may keep competing for the Olympics due to anticipated prestige and economic returns, even though the historical record shows that the actual cost-benefit balance is often unfavorable.

The advantages people talk about are limited: the crowds, the high prices and the fear of security problems keep the regular visitors away, and this wipes out much of what tourists spend during the Games. However, a long-term "Olympic legacy" rarely materializes. Venues built just for the Games often turn into "white elephants", expensive structures that see little use afterwards and cost millions each year to keep up. Only one modern Games, Los Angeles in 1984, has clearly made a profit; it did so mainly by using the infrastructure the city already had instead of building new venues [8]. The costs are not only financial: to make room for venues and infrastructure, hosting often uproots local communities and forces thousands of residents to move.

3. Specific discussion of the Super Bowl

Around the world, the Super Bowl is among the most watched sporting events. According to estimates, Super Bowl LX (60) drew an average of 124.9 million viewers in 2026, which was down from the record of 127.7 million in 2025. Because of this publicity, cities want to host the Super Bowl, and several bids are made every year. Cities anticipate both immediate and long-term benefits from hosting the Super Bowl. The immediate effect is the additional revenue that the event brings in. Hotels, restaurants and parking facilities all expect more customers in the two weeks before the game. The long-term benefit comes from the exposure that the host city receives. The hope is that this exposure will bring more tourism even after the game is over.

However, how much revenue the cities that host the Super Bowl really receive is a matter of much dispute. At the upper end, the estimates run from \$300 million to as much as \$1.3 billion. Mike Edwards holds that these figures are inflated, and his estimate is \$150 million in net income to residents [2]. There are two explanations for these differences. First, according to Edwards, the economic impact of the Super Bowl has been greatly exaggerated [2].

Edwards also points out that these are different measures. The larger numbers seem to be total revenue, and the \$150 million is what local residents actually receive. All ticket revenue goes to the National Football League, and it also earns money from merchandise and television contracts. The revenue of local governments comes from sales, hospitality and gas taxes. Also, local governments have to pay the expenses for security and infrastructure.

This discussion also shows one of the difficulties in measuring the economic effects of hosting large scale events. Hotels and restaurants may be full during the event, but this does not mean that all of this traffic comes from the event. Even if every customer in these establishments is there for the Super Bowl, there is still no net gain in revenue. If these businesses are usually eighty percent occupied, then only the additional twenty percent can be credited to the game itself. Under this 'crowding effect', the regular customers who would normally fill these spaces cannot do so while the event lasts. Studies that ignore this point and count only the people who come for the game tend to overestimate the real economic impact of hosting high profile events such as the Super Bowl.

4. Specific discussion of the Olympics

4.1. The economic impact of hosting the Olympics

One analysis notes that "hosting the Olympics is a prestigious honor that brings global recognition to the host city but also has significant economic implications" [9]. The Olympics are a world-famous mega sporting event, and during the competition period they attract huge crowds of tourists, athletes and media personnel from all over the world. This considerable inflow of visitors directly boosts consumption and brings considerable revenue to local hotels, restaurants, retail stores and other related businesses. In order to meet the operational demands of the Games, host cities have to invest on a large scale in urban transportation, public facilities and professional sports venues. In theory, these infrastructure upgrades can serve local residents and promote urban development in the long run, and they can become a lasting legacy of the Olympics.

Still, the economic drawbacks of hosting the Olympics are just as prominent and cannot be ignored. Building exclusive competition venues, renovating infrastructure on a full scale and providing round-the-clock security all need enormous capital input; the related expenses tend to rise fast, and severe budget overruns are the frequent result. In addition, most professional sports venues are designed only for the Olympic events. After the Games end, host cities usually cannot find sustainable long-term uses for these large facilities, so a great number of stadiums and venues sit idle and underused for years.

In general, host cities gain short-term economic growth, temporary employment, better public infrastructure and widespread international exposure from hosting the Olympics. On the other hand, a heavy financial burden is placed on local governments and taxpayers. Problems such as uncontrolled budget overruns, accumulated debt, the displacement of residents and idle post-event facilities have become common challenges for Olympic host cities.

4.2. The true cost of hosting the Olympics

Overspending on the Olympic Games has become normal in the modern era. In the words of Hite, "in every case, the bill for hosting the Olympics has turned out to be dramatically higher than originally budgeted" [10]. A study from the University of Oxford puts the mean cost overrun of the Games since 1976 at a remarkable 215%. In fact, the strain on a host city's finances begins years before the opening ceremony. Preparing for the Olympics usually occupies a period of seven to ten years. Even before a bid is formally awarded, the candidate city must enter into a detailed host city contract with the International Olympic Committee. More than 200 pages of binding obligations are set out in that contract, and they require the host city to complete comprehensive urban renewal and supporting construction to uniform standards.

Each edition of the Games has cost more than the last; therefore, the International Olympic Committee has begun to rethink how the event should develop. Future hosts are now encouraged to use venues and public facilities that already exist and to avoid new, single-purpose facilities that will be used only once. This policy responds directly to a problem every host has faced, namely runaway costs and wasted construction. A review of the typical cases, Beijing, London, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo and Paris, leaves little doubt that the escalating expense has turned the Olympics into a heavy economic load for host cities everywhere.

4.3. Cost benefit analysis of hosting the Olympics

The economic benefits of hosting an Olympic Games may be smaller than people commonly assume. Decades of practical experience show that the economic gains from the Olympics fall far short of public expectations. According to the statistics, every Olympic Games held since 1960 has gone beyond its initial budget. In another analysis by the University of Oxford, the average cost overrun rate of these Games is put at 172% [3]. The Week, citing Investopedia, reports that the 1984 Games made Los Angeles the "only host city that realized a profit from the games," largely "because the infrastructure required of them already existed" [3].

Losing money is one problem; what to do with the Olympic facilities afterwards is another, and it is not easy to solve. Many Olympic arenas have become so-called "white elephants", expensive to build, almost useless once the Games end, and still in need of money for upkeep every day. The Games also hurt tourism: the huge crowds, the strict security checks and the sharp price increases keep many of the usual tourists at home. As a result, in several host cities tourism income has actually gone down while the Games were being held. In short, the real economic return from hosting the Olympics is far below the optimistic forecasts made in advance, and excessive costs, weak job growth and a fall in regular tourism come up again and again.

5. The economics of hosting the FIFA World Cup

5.1. The economic impact of hosting the World Cup

Cities that take part in the FIFA World Cup are usually told that it will change their economy: more tourism income, more business for hotels and restaurants, and a revival of local spending. However, independent economists have looked at the numbers and reached a different conclusion, namely that the gains in the advertisements are inflated by crowding-out and by forecasting methods that exaggerate. As they put it, "What tends to happen instead is that others stay away to avoid the congestion, traffic jams, higher prices, and security issues" [11]. Thousands of traveling fans arrive for the matches, but the ordinary holidaymakers and business travelers postpone or cancel their trips; thus, a large part of the tourism money that was expected never comes. In other words, the displacement wipes out much of the short-term visitor spending that the promoters call a core economic benefit.

Kansas City before the 2026 North American tournament shows on a small scale how unevenly the World Cup affects a local economy, and the short-term rental market is the clearest illustration. City officials predicted hotel rooms would run out and that Airbnbs and VRBOs would be in heavy demand; property owners responded by placing a large number of new listings on the market. AirDNA recorded a 47% increase in short-term rental bookings and a 65% increase in rates on the year before, but with so many new listings the occupancy of each was thin [12]. A minority of owners made a good seasonal income; many struggled to keep their properties booked, and the tournament's financial rewards were therefore spread very unequally among local small businesses.

Public judgment of the World Cup's worth rests largely on official economic forecasts, and those forecasts carry a built-in bias. "Those reports are done with false methodologies and unrealistic assumptions and they come out with fantastic results. But the independent economists who have studied this, the academics who have looked at this without an axe to grind, have concluded that mega sporting events are not generally positive forces for the local economy" [11]. Event studies commissioned by FIFA or a city government as a rule ignore three things: crowding-out risk, the long-term cost of maintaining facilities, and income that drains away to corporations in other states.

Also, research on event after event agrees: a handful of host regions enjoy a short tourism spike, but in most communities the activity lost elsewhere cancels it, and gross domestic product shows no lasting growth [13].

5.2. The true cost of hosting the World Cup

Any economic return is speculative, but the public financial burden on the host municipality is real, open-ended, and far larger than the pre-tournament budget. People in the industry do not disguise the imbalance: "There are very, very significant costs to host cities... I think it's fair to say that none of them will benefit economically from [the World Cup] because they don't get the revenue, but they get the costs, which can run well over \$100 million" [11]. In addition, these six-figure municipal outlays go beyond stadium upgrades; the city must also pay for extra public safety personnel, temporary transit changes, event cleaning and city-wide beautification, with no permanent income stream to recover the outlay.

Much of the spending that no one can forecast is the result of the one-sided legal agreements that FIFA requires every host jurisdiction to sign. In the competition contracts for the World Cup, all legal and financial liability is transferred to the local government, and the host city is made fully responsible for "overall safety and security" and for "all taxes, duties and levies" generated during the tournament [14]. At the same time, security and logistics costs are especially hard to estimate, and after the tournament begins, every overrun is paid from public funds. The problem of public finance comes down to this: "The key question is not whether there will be public spending. The question is how it will be financed and who will absorb the costs once the excitement fades" [15]. The matches are over within weeks, but the debt for infrastructure, the cost of maintaining venues and the deficits the municipality has accumulated remain for decades.

5.3. Cost benefit analysis of hosting the World Cup

Once total public outlay is set against locally kept revenue, the World Cup hosting model is a structurally one-sided exchange, and net municipal losses are virtually certain. The main imbalance is in the revenue ownership rules: "Basically, FIFA gets all the money and the costs fall upon the host city" [11]. Under the standard tournament contracts, host cities get no share of the high-value matchday revenue streams such as ticket sales, stadium concession profits, official merchandise and on-site parking fees. Independent analysts sum this up plainly: "Without any of the revenue, it's not a very good bargain at all" [11].

FIFA's standardized hosting agreements now keep municipalities away from commercial gains more strictly than ever. ProPublica reports that, according to experts, World Cup contracts "lock host cities out of prospective revenues more than ever, leaving FIFA with a larger share of the revenue" [14]. Host cities "get little tangible benefit in return" and "do not see a slice of game-day revenues from ticket sales, concessions and merchandise, or parking" [14]. Each participating local government signs the same one-sided contract and gives up all commercial rights in exchange for the right to host matches; there is no negotiating power to renegotiate the clauses on revenue splitting.

Peer-reviewed economics on mega-events of the same kind backs the unfavorable cost-benefit judgment on World Cup hosts. In widely cited work on large sporting competitions, Robert Baade and Victor Matheson call Olympic hosting a "money-losing proposition," and their verdict carries over to the World Cup unchanged [13]. Study after study reaches one result: a passing tourism surge, modest short-term rental profits and a little media exposure come nowhere near covering nine-figure

public outlays, unplanned security costs and years of facility maintenance. Thus, in nearly every city, hosting expenses permanently exceed whatever economic benefit local residents can be shown to have received.

5.4. The economics of hosting the World Cup games

With risk and reward so badly matched, medium-sized and regional cities have grown ever less willing to bid for World Cup matches. A host government accepts public spending with no ceiling and no reliable forecast, and gets no ticket, merchandise or broadcasting money to offset it. A mega-event does deliver brief civic pride and worldwide media attention, but such intangible rewards do not correct the underlying financial imbalance in FIFA's hosting structure. Therefore, in strictly economic terms, the standard World Cup hosting arrangement produces a net loss, time after time, for participating municipalities anywhere in the world.

6. Small-scale grassroots sports: China's Village BA

The previous sections analyzed massive international sporting events such as the Olympic Games and the FIFA World Cup; these events involve staggering public expenditure, one-sided profit distribution and long-term fiscal risks for host cities. This section will turn to small-scale indigenous sports events and take Village BA (CunBA) in Taijiang County, Guizhou Province as a representative grassroots case. It will examine the cultural origins, self-sustaining financial model and wide socioeconomic spillover effects, and then compare the case with mega-events. In this way, this paper puts forward a low-risk, inclusive model of sports development that differs from capital-intensive global competitions.

6.1. Origins & local institutional basis

6.1.1. Ethnic folk integration with ultra-low participation costs

The sporting tradition of Village BA goes back to 1936, when local Miao villagers brought basketball into the annual Sixth Month New Rice Festival. Traditional festival entertainment such as bullfighting and horse racing needed high feeding and time costs; basketball needs only an open plot and simple hoops, with extremely low marginal input. Villagers of all ages can take part in it, and over nearly 90 years of accumulation it has gradually become the core activity of Miao folk customs. This endogenous cultural foundation is a competitive barrier that copied rural sports events in other parts of China cannot replicate.

6.1.2. Three-party collaborative governance model

Village BA runs on a balanced system of villager autonomy, government support services and enterprise commercial operation. Village basketball associations and resident volunteer groups handle the on-site matches, and local officials give only peripheral support such as security, medical care and transportation. A grid governance system named "One Center, One Grid, Ten-Household Units" settles conflicts efficiently among the tens of thousands of peak-time tourists. County-level cultural and tourism companies take charge of brand licensing and industrial development; thus, the system is self-governed, government-backed and market-assisted.

6.2. Financial operation & empirical data

6.2.1. Diversified local revenue streams

Where mainstream sport lives on ticket revenue and venue sponsorship, Village BA charges nothing at the gate and allows no advertising on site. Its sustainable income consists of rent from venue stalls, parking charges, fees for licensing its intellectual property, and sales of farm produce and cultural merchandise. Its cultural and creative merchandise has reached 100 items in 41 product categories (its mascot "CunBaobao" among them) [16], and all intellectual property profit is paid into the village collective's funds. In addition, villagers, entrepreneurs from the area and regional companies contribute voluntary donations. None of the money leaves for outside commercial organizations; all of it circulates within the rural community.

6.2.2. Controllable and low operating costs

The full-cycle operating cost of one Village BA tournament is about 400,000 renminbi (RMB), mostly for professional referee fees and daily venue maintenance. Labor expenses are largely cut by the wide volunteer participation of local villagers. More importantly, matches use existing open-air rural courts and not newly built exclusive stadiums; thus, the "white elephant" venue risk that troubles Olympic and World Cup host cities is eliminated.

County-level macro data show a strong local growth effect from Village BA: tourist arrivals rose from 1.65 million in 2022 to 3.79 million in 2024, and tourism revenue was 1.71 billion RMB in 2022 and 4.37 billion RMB in 2024 (reported as comprehensive tourism revenue and total tourist spending, respectively) [17, 18]. At the village level, the collective revenue of Taipan Village was more than 1.7 million RMB in 2022 and more than 5.3 million RMB in 2024 [19]. Rural residents in the county had a per capita disposable income of 14,059 RMB in 2024 [18], against 9,301 RMB in 2019 [20]. Demographically, the labor outflow has been reversed: 70% of residents who once left for jobs have come back to run homestays, restaurants and handicraft stores, and rural hollowing has been turned around.

6.3. Vertical comparison with the Olympic Games and FIFA World Cup

Three core contrasts exist between grassroots Village BA and global mega-events:

1. Cost and fiscal risk: Hosting the Olympics or World Cup requires tens of billions of public funds for dedicated infrastructure, leaving underused venues and long-term municipal debt. Village BA utilizes existing rural public space with almost no large-scale construction investment, creating zero long-term fiscal burden for local governments.

2. Revenue allocation mechanism: The International Olympic Committee and FIFA monopolize ticket, broadcast and merchandise profits, leaving host cities to bear all expenditures. All industrial and intellectual property gains from Village BA belong to village collectives and are redistributed to local residents.

3. Tourism and economic effect: Mega-events trigger crowd-out effects, pushing regular tourists away due to high prices and congestion. Village BA facilitates integrated agriculture, handicraft and tourism development, generating steady, balanced year-round consumption growth rather than one-off temporary visitor surges.

6.4. Comprehensive economic and social spillover effects

Village BA has linked the primary, secondary and tertiary industries into one chain. Visitors who come for the games buy local produce, and this gives blueberry growers and rice-fish symbiosis farms a steady market. Also, Miao silver ornament and embroidery workshops, the manufacturing link, now sell more in their shops and online. Homestays, night markets and live-stream e-commerce, the service link, are booming; the Village BA market area alone contains more than 420 stalls and has created over 1,000 jobs [16].

Village BA has changed the social life of the village too. Since the village introduced its grid management system, local governance has improved a great deal; civil disputes fell from 39 in 2023 to only 5 in 2024, and there was no public security incident at all that year. In addition, the collective's income is distributed so that every household benefits: in 2024 the 272 households [21] each received a cash dividend of 400 RMB [19], and the village buys medical insurance for everyone over 80. Basketball and Miao rituals now go together, and this strengthens the villagers' ethnic cultural identity and community cohesion.

7. Conclusion

Village BA and the large international tournaments represent two economic models of sports hosting that could hardly be more different. The mega-event needs heavy capital, carries high risk and leaks its profits outward: the external sports organizations take most of the gains, and the local taxpayers are left with all of the costs and the liabilities that follow. On the other hand, Village BA grew out of the community itself; its upfront investment is small, its profits stay in the village, and its economic and social returns are balanced. Rural households and the village collective have gained measurable income, and grassroots governance, the handing down of ethnic culture and rural revitalization have all made real progress. Other places can copy the case, and it gives small-scale sporting events around the world a sustainable, people-centered model that avoids the financial traps of the Olympic and World Cup host cities.

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