

Large Model Integration into Corporate Governance Structure: Manifestations, Risks and Regulatory Paths

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Abstract. With the advancement of digital technology, AI-based governance, particularly large models, is being gradually introduced in many organizations at home and abroad. While improving decision-making efficiency, it has also brought about a series of complex and prominent problems, such as imbalanced distribution of power, ambiguous liability determination systems, partial failure of supervision mechanisms, and the expansion of monopolistic power of leading enterprises; These problems are due to the limitations of traditional corporate governance theories, organizational inertia of bureaucratic structures and other reasons; In order to fully leverage the advantages of integrating large models into corporate governance, it is necessary to rebuild power structures and enhance accountability mechanisms. At the same time, it is necessary to update the fiduciary duty system for directors by expanding the scope of their duty of loyalty and duty of care, and promote adaptive changes in organisational forms. In order to prevent and control major public risks and promote the rule-of-law-based transformation of corporate governance in the digital economy era.

Keywords: large models, corporate governance structure, fiduciary duties

1. Introduction

With the development of digital technology, such as big data and AI, integrated large-scale models are gradually beginning to be applied in the field of corporate governance with new features; they can inherit the synergistic pattern and have dynamic liability rules. The integration produces a "high-efficiency revolution" and "governance restructuring" in the transformation of corporate governance [1]. It is likely to cause problems in both algorithmic black boxes and data security; at the same time, it will also alter the nature and content of obligations under legal relationships. There is currently no systematic response in existing scholarship to these structural problems.

Therefore, based on the existing organizational law of corporations in China, it is necessary to refine the fiduciary duty system, formulate internal supervisory rules, and implement an organizational restructuring through legal means. In order to provide response strategies for improving the corporate governance structure in the digital age, it is intended that this approach will enable the deep integration of corporate governance and digital technology.

2. Technical principles and risks of embedding large models in corporate governance structures

Traditional corporate governance is mainly comprised of two basic components: the process of key links such as decision-making and supervision and execution; the cognition judgment and behaviour implementation by individuals. The use of large language models implies that AI has started to be involved in the main decision-making processes. On the inside, it disrupts the power distribution and the system of checks and balances built around humans making decisions [2]. Externally, it generates public risks involving infringements on data property rights and privacy rights due to the spiraling competitive advantage of leading enterprises. The underlying logic and potential risks of embedding large models into corporate governance structures manifest as follows:

2.1. Imbalance and distortion in power allocation

As organizations with a basic attribute of society obtain their own stability through the separation of shareholders' ownership and the board's operational authority; however, the embedding of large models has replaced this dualistic structure with a complex tripartite relationship among ownership, technical execution rights and control. Under the impetus of shareholders, enterprises introduce management systems based on large models to obtain technical support for efficient decision-making through data import and autonomous learning. The technical empowerment decreases the agency cost of information transparency; Therefore, the corporate governance structure will change from a traditional hierarchical system to an open one with multiple participation entities and flexible control links. On the other hand, it is also difficult to make the technical execution process public. In addition, over-reliance on the stability of large model technologies can significantly decrease the risk resilience of governance structures.

2.1.1. Narrowing the internal information gap within organizations

In traditional governance, agency costs and information asymmetry frequently place minority shareholders in a predicament of not being able to exercise their rights properly; However, the application of digital technology is expected to help reduce the information gap between corporate shareholders and managers. Under the traditional governance structure, information asymmetry is an essential cause of the severe problem of agency cost [3]. The development of large AI models has broken the traditional model of asymmetric ability. Shaped by shareholders, the enterprises are putting management systems combined with large model interfaces into use. By inputting operation data into the system for autonomous learning, it can produce professional solutions to support business decision-making with little human intervention. This empowers shareholders, enhancing their ability to participate in governance and monitor management. This trend pushes the governance structure towards a more equitable, shared, and collaborative model. However, with the change in power distribution over time and reduced internal communication barriers, there may be confusion about who is accountable for which matters among stakeholders such as shareholders and members of the board of directors; At the same time, this ambiguity will also add an uncertain element to determining individual responsibility.

2.1.2. Adjustments in the rights of corporate senior management

With the weakening of traditional constraints and balances, the rights and obligations borne by directors and other senior managers have also changed accordingly. Traditionally, in a company's

governance structure, the board of directors serves as the primary centre of power. Located in a formal position above the shareholders' meeting and below the management team in terms of authority hierarchy, according to Article 46 of the Company Law of the People's Republic of China, its specific statutory powers are defined. Implement the resolutions of the shareholders' meeting; formulate plans for enterprise operations and major issues; establish an internal organizational structure, select key personnel and determine their division of labour based on that structure, and establish basic management rules and regulations. Large-model empowerment causes the direction in which most model-based companies are focused to change, and that is away from routine operation-related issues. Instead of this, with the broad application of data integration and transformation, these models can now participate in the decision-making process.

Under the director advisory model, directors mainly integrate the deep model within the corporate system through open-source technology and train it with internal data to obtain customized governance suggestions. At the same time, there is a change in the core competencies of board members. Their authority has evolved from making decisions to managing and supervising the decision-making generation process. This change goes beyond simply using their own business judgment or basic rationality to oversee the quality of insights produced by large models and the efficiency of subsequent tracking and handling. Select technical tools, control data input, and review the reasonableness of output results.

In the context of the alternative director model, the company adopts the approach of purchasing professional services to introduce outsourced directors outside the manual system, partially or fully replacing the functions of specific directors. This model may produce extreme structures with a single "outsourced director", at which point the traditional roles of the board are partly taken over by a technological entity, transforming the rights of human directors into the power to choose outsourced technical services, coordinate among various parties, and exert ultimate control over the final decision. Regardless of which model is used, the use of a large number of embedding by directors can give rise to new manifestations of their rights - exercising control, intervention and interpretation over algorithmic systems indirectly through these means.

2.1.3. Redefinition of senior personnel obligations

Under the director-advisor model, with the transformation of director functions comes multi-faceted responsibilities; directors need to have basic technical literacy at the same time as bearing decision-making responsibility for whether to adopt or reject model recommendations and the resulting consequences. Especially when using A2A technology, that is, Agent Collaboration Network technology, directors will need to collaborate with many professional agents and request high-level managers for final decisions; therefore, they must be able to understand the decision-making mechanism and detect algorithmic bias.

Governance structures that use the model of replacing directors have shown a higher degree of deviation from duty owing to weakened director autonomy under information siloing. This is manifested specifically as follows: The neutrality of algorithms makes it difficult to trace and identify distorted computational results, thus eroding the environment for performing fiduciary duties ; Algorithmic participation changes the assessment standard of the "knowledge requirement" of the duty of care, making it relatively easy to avoid this obligation [4]. This model deviates from the traditional liability system based on individual rationality and requires corporate executives to bear the responsibility for establishing the ultimate accountability chain of algorithmic decision-making. This presents a problem in the intersection and boundary of fiduciary duty systems with external product liability or tort liability [5].

2.2. The dilemma of failing oversight mechanisms

Although large models help enterprises improve the efficiency of decision-making, there is an inherent contradiction between their technical attributes and the regulatory system of conventional enterprises. As a result, there is an increasing amount of supervision, but it has weakened in terms of effect.

First of all, with the permeation of generative large models at all levels and links in the process of business decisions, deep learning systems have gradually evolved from auxiliary tools to entities that can make autonomous decisions. Due to their high professionalism and difficulty in understanding, they have become opaque black boxes. In terms of internal supervision, due to the lack of AI knowledge, there is difficulty in thoroughly examining whether the data is accurate, whether research norms have been followed, and if it is reasonable for model parameters. Substantive examination has increased in difficulty; it is increasingly difficult for the traditional supervision model relying on meeting minutes and written reports to operate against algorithmic-generated governance recommendations.

Second, external market supervision is fractured and weakened as a result of the natural lag in its implementation. At its root, the application of digital technology in corporate governance has a double-effect: on one hand, professional investment institutions and investors using data platforms have improved analysis ability, more accurate decision-making, widened the information and capability gap between them and ordinary investors, small shareholders. On the one hand, enterprises increase their operating efficiency with the help of big data and AI; On the other hand, if enterprises still rely heavily on subjective judgments when dealing with risks, then even smart early-warning systems cannot work effectively. Therefore, it takes a long time to find out the problem and take measures in response; At this point, there has been some damage to the enterprise already.

2.3. Challenges in legal liability determination

After the integration of large models into corporate governance, based on the existing legal liability framework that is primarily built upon fiduciary duty and tort liability rooted in human rationality and behavioral explainability, there are adaptability issues regarding the subject of liability, characterization of behaviour, and determination of causality.

2.3.1. Adaptability pressure on the fiduciary duty system

As mentioned earlier, the application of large models has changed the fundamental nature of directors' roles and their behaviour. Based on this newly occurred circumstances under the framework of fiduciary obligation defined in the present Company Law, a series of adaptability problems emerge.

On the one hand, the traditional fiduciary duty system assumes that it is easy to interpret and trace the actions. Due to the highly specialized nature and technical obscurity of decisions made by large models, it is challenging to determine whether such conduct is reasonable. In terms of the rationality of algorithmic models, they cannot be considered a practical criterion for decision-making anymore.

On the other hand, one of the main purposes of the traditional duty of care is to maximize shareholders' interests. However, the widespread application of large model algorithms has dramatically amplified the social impact (i.e., externalities) of corporate decisions. It is necessary to expand the object of corporate governance from a single pursuit of shareholder value to a balance

among multiple stakeholder interests and prevent social damage caused by the abuse of technology. Accordingly, the connotation of the directors' duties should be expanded to include "supervising algorithms and guiding them towards benevolence" [6], otherwise it may seem that they are too limited in scope and unable to face public problems caused by technological development.

2.3.2. The dilemma of liability attribution in algorithmic infringements

As a key supporting technology for the construction of a digital society, algorithmic decision-making inherently has high technical and professional thresholds because it is special in nature and its data processing is complex. Traditional infringement has a clear subject and object, but the mysterious decision-making process and intricate operation rules of algorithmic infringement are very difficult to hold someone responsible for. The existing corporate governance framework mainly addresses natural persons and struggles to precisely match the unique features of digital technology. Using either model - purchasing an independent AI advisory system or outsourcing to a third-party intelligent consulting service - has the risk of harm from intelligent decision-making. With the development of the industry, third-party institutions have become more likely to limit or exempt their liability in contracts; consequently, companies' and directors' liability risks will increase accordingly. Therefore, the primary issue in constructing an algorithmic liability system under the background of large-scale model integration is defining each party's responsibility scope - that is, who is responsible for designing algorithms and what requirements they must meet; What conditions apply to users when utilizing such algorithms, etc. It is essential to systematically examine the misinterpretations and errors caused by algorithms; at the same time, special attention should be paid to algorithm designers and developers as the primary subjects accountable for coding and logical construction.

3. Analysis of the causes of issues arising from the integration of large models into corporate governance structures

As artificial intelligence technologies, centred around large models, are deeply integrated into all aspects of corporate governance, the inherent defects and deficiencies of the traditional governance system become more prominent, and it is unable to make timely and effective responses. The following sections will explore the root causes from an organizational studies perspective, etc.

3.1. Limitations of traditional corporate governance theory

The traditional corporate governance norms that are still in widespread use today have become detached from the actual situation of data-driven and model-embedded governance. Traditional corporate governance theory originates in the industrial economy era and mainly studies agency costs resulting from the separation of ownership and control. The corresponding governance method is to enhance the power of shareholders and improve the governance structure. However, under the background of large-model-embedded governance structure, although minority shareholders have gained some rights, due to information asymmetry, their actual situation is not fundamentally changed. It can be said that this has not increased the power of the system into an increase in governance efficiency. At the same time, traditional theories are rooted in the research framework of dispersed ownership and based on assumptions about individual rationality and resource scarcity; they find it difficult to explain or adapt to the new governance reality of increasingly abundant data elements. The foundation of this class is eroding due to classical theory. The traditional rights

allocation mechanism based on the three-step combination of "authorisation - supervision - execution" has made no provisions for power limits and responsibility division in new circumstances, such as the director-adviser mode or external board services. Some issues in practice occur due to these restrictions, leading to cumbersome decision-making procedures; there is a problem of inefficient resource utilization; It cannot adjust flexibly enough for market fluctuations; There are deficiencies in the risk management system [7]. As a result, the corporate structure is not responsive enough in response to a complicated market situation; therefore, it cannot provide scientific prediction references or implement timely changes for enterprises according to dynamic information.

3.2. Conflict in rights allocation under Coase's theorem

From a law and economics perspective, embedding large models into a corporation—an entity inherently fraught with competing rights—introduces a new variable that intensifies existing power frictions. The current corporate law regulations are based on traditional "person-to-person" agency models and physical production methods. Their institutional assumptions have difficulty covering the new governance situations of "human-machine collaborative work" and so forth; at the same time, there may also be disputes involving algorithms themselves, which are difficult to resolve through existing institutional frameworks. Pure legal dogmatics may be unable to solve this problem, but the efficiency theory of conflicting rights allocation based on Coasean law and economics provides an explanation.

The essence of Coase's Theorem is as follows: Market transactions require defining the preconditions for rights; under an ideal environment without transaction costs, regardless of how rights are allocated, it will not change the overall social welfare; In the actual situation where transaction costs exist widely, rights definition and the arrangement of effective legal institutions have become key links.

The application of large models has changed the relative power positions of internal corporate governance participants to some extent. Power may become excessively concentrated in departments that lead the application of technology, and traditional supervisory bodies may lose their power due to the technical knowledge gap caused by the algorithmic black box. For instance, some high-tech enterprises use complicated algorithmic lists from large models when laying off employees but struggle to give a reasonable explanation to their staff later as to where each person ranks in this list. Examining this rights allocation conflict through the lens of Coase's Theorem shows that it is due to the lack of technical interpretative authority for senior corporate executives, such as directors, and a lack of a clear preset liability attribution mechanism. A large amount of information and negotiation costs have been generated, and in the end, the governance mechanism failed.

3.3. Organizational inertia of bureaucratic structures

Transformations in governance brought about by large models do not only involve economically rational conflicts over rights allocations but also face resistance against deeply entrenched bureaucratic organisational inertia at the organisational level. Organisations once formed have a certain degree of cognitive rigidity and path dependence, and the changes in their own state are difficult to achieve [8].

Organisations that reach agreement develop their own organisational cultures and a sense of mission ; after the basic formation of organisational culture, it has strong self-sustaining force [9]. Inertia is manifested as rigid thinking that resists change and a fixed way of thinking. Kodak

developed the world's first digital camera in 1975. However, management, constrained by path dependency as the film business accounted for more than 90 per cent of the company's profits at the time, chose to set aside this disruptive technology and devote all resources to traditional production.

Against the backdrop of integrating large models into corporate governance, management, constrained by path dependency on existing business models, tends to use cultural inertia in corporate decision-making and adopt a wait-and-see or resistant attitude towards the all-round application of large models. In addition, too much emphasis on conforming to existing data management procedures and approval regulations may make us fail to identify the essential goal of using large models to boost efficiency improvements and innovation development; therefore, new risk problems such as "goal substitution" will appear. Organisational inertia continues, and leaders find it hard to accept facts that conflict with their deep-seated ideas [10], which is likely to hinder the advancement of corporate governance modernisation and the application promotion of large models.

4. Regulatory adaptation of large models embedded in corporate governance

In response to many problems that arise during the deep integration of large models into corporate governance, it is necessary to regulate some corporate behaviors through relevant rules and regulations in a timely manner; at the same time, improve the accompanying oversight rules, fiduciary duty and organizational form.

4.1. Organizational form adjustments

In response to the problem of uneven rights distribution caused by large models, it is necessary to make dual adjustments at both the internal and external levels of organisational form: At an internal level, separate powers and impose constraints and supervision; At an external level, take structural measures to control public risks such as the continuous enlargement of monopolistic power of leading model-driven companies.

4.1.1. Internal adjustments: dynamic adaptation and flattening transformation

First of all, in the internal right allocation of corporate governance embedded with large models, there must be a balance between balance and dynamic adaptability. The key to the internal right allocation of companies equipped with embedded large-scale models is to build a sound oversight mechanism for model output opinions. If the authority in technological development is too concentrated and lacking in necessary checks and balances, there is a risk that companies will focus excessively on pursuing their own commercial interests at the expense of social values. Therefore, there needs to be more than one internal supervision node established so that the dynamic distribution of ownership, management rights and supervisory power can be carried out according to changes in risks. The second is that the adjustment of the enterprise management structure tends to be flat, networked and virtualization. In the context of the digital age, enterprises need to reduce management levels and delegate some powers appropriately to ensure smooth information flow and inter-departmental cooperation; Shift the focus of corporate governance from power distribution between the shareholders' meeting and the board to prioritizing the quality of the founding team and management decisions.

4.1.2. External adjustments: control of public risks and organizational intervention

If the application of model-driven enterprises for new regulatory techniques poses a large-scale public risk issue, administrative regulators at all levels should be introduced promptly to respond and control. Drawing on the ideas of antitrust law, we can start from the perspective of regulatory innovation of organizational divestiture and take the following two paths: ex-ante prevention and ex-post trade-off.

The ex-ante method is aimed at model-driven enterprises that have achieved public identity, and their particular duty to perform is determined through an all-encompassing assessment of risk behaviour and prediction results [11]. The main contents are divided into three parts: Firstly, it is necessary to determine whether the enterprise has a dominant market position; Secondly, compliance objectives, including economic and ethical requirements, need to be established; Thirdly, It is necessary to regulate the behaviour of enterprises in various aspects, such as data management and algorithm disclosure. As long as the company fulfills its due obligations in accordance with its market status, it will not be divested. The ex post approach is aimed at enterprises that have already caused significant damage risk, and it needs to be determined whether they should be divested. Initiating divestiture must adhere to the principle of proportionality, which stipulates that the purpose must be legitimate (targeting risk prevention and control, rather than regulatory rent-seeking); The means should be proper and necessary; divestiture is not required if there are other lower-cost alternatives available; Finally, a benefit assessment should be carried out to ensure that the social benefits generated by divestiture exceed its economic cost by a considerable margin [12]. Through ex-ante guidance and ex-post deterrence, on the one hand, respect for the organizational independence of enterprises is maintained; On the other hand, effective management of the potential public risks they may pose is achieved.

4.2. Multi-dimensional construction of oversight rules

To solve the problem of partial failure in the oversight mechanism and build a new type of oversight rule that is more adaptable, this paper elucidates the construction concepts and organizational structure of a multidimensional regulatory model from the perspective of oversight models and oversight structure [13].

4.2.1. Clarify the oversight model of risk classification and process transparency

In performing their technical supervision duties, supervision bodies should take scientific and reasonable evaluation criteria as the primary basis and adjust the oversight process according to changes in technology. First, implement scenario-based classified supervision. Build a classified supervision system according to factors like algorithm risk level and the attributes of transaction subjects. Algorithms involved in automated layoff decisions, credit evaluation, dynamic price adjustment, and other aspects that significantly affect individuals' rights and interests should be categorized as "high-risk scenarios" and subject to stringent transparency and auditing rules; Other inner-process optimization, non-critical predictions, etc., can be divided into the category of "low-risk scenarios". When the transaction counterparty is a small and medium-sized operator, the company needs to raise its standards of care in algorithmic supervision and ensure the transparency and credibility of algorithmic logic; If the transaction counterparty is a large market entity, the threshold for the duty of care can be appropriately reduced, but it must still meet the general compliance criteria of the industry.

Secondly, introduce full-process public supervision. At the technical level, necessary means, such as legislation and rule-making [14], can be used to oblige enterprises to employ techniques like LIME to produce an algorithmic decision report that offers generalized reasons for related judgments during supervision [15]. At the same time, an algorithm inventory should be established to record related data for model training and set parameters for subsequent inspection. Finally, establish a full-cycle closed-loop supervision procedure, which means that supervision should run through the entire cycle. During the model introduction phase, the board of directors must submit a feasibility demonstration report for the application of large models that includes risk response plans ; During the model operation period, the management team needs to release risk evaluation reports and operational logs regularly; In the model implementation and application stage, sandbox supervision and embedded monitoring techniques should be used to dynamically follow the algorithm's operating process [16].

4.2.2. Strengthen the professional collaboration and internal-external linked oversight subjects

The practical application of the supervision mechanism cannot be separated from professional internal supervisors and an external supervisory network. Regarding the oversight subjects, it is essential to enhance the technical expertise and overall competence of personnel; that is to say, we need to boost people's general abilities and expertise simultaneously. If the internal audit staff at a company do not have professional knowledge in AI, it will reduce the practical effect of front-line risk prevention and control. Therefore, at the regulatory level, it can be explicitly stipulated in departmental rules that enterprises must have full-time supervision staff with qualifications in digital technology; Alternatively, such a condition could be established as a rebuttable presumption rule to prompt enterprises to proactively disclose information on their own compliance with alternative oversight plans. A technical committee should also be established to bridge the knowledge gap between older corporate members and prevent them from making management errors due to a lack of understanding of new technologies or equipment; at the same time, it is essential to avoid technical misoperations caused by cognitive bias among management personnel during operation.

4.2.3. Construct an oversight structure with algorithmic connection.

In terms of the oversight structure, given that there is currently a popularization trend in large language models, external regulatory measures - for example, filing algorithms or third-party algorithmic audits - have become inevitable choices, and so it is necessary to connect efficiently with these enterprise-level internal supervision processes. For enterprises that have built an internal compliance inspection mechanism, they may apply to regulatory authorities for exemption from certain review procedures by submitting documents such as a "Commitment Letter for Self-Certification of Compliance Risks"; at the same time, other external supervision forces, such as government supervision and social public opinion supervision, should also be considered.

4.3. Clarifying legal liability

The application of the integration of large models in corporate governance essentially changes the role, position, and the boundary of rights and responsibilities for directors and other management personnel. To address the problems of defining legal liability and the pressure on updating the fiduciary duty system for specific situations, it is necessary to expand the content and context application of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care.

4.3.1. Refine the specific connotation of the duty of loyalty

The main content of the duty of loyalty is to safeguard the overall interests of the company and prevent risks from conflicts of interest. In the director-advisor framework, there needs to be rigorous conflict-of-interest review requirements for each director. Check if the model output involves personal interests or implicit bias; Verify the source and use of data; Prevent users from shifting the responsibility due to algorithmic neutrality. In the director-replacement mode, under the core of the duty of loyalty, prevent improper interests connections or interest transfers from directors to outsourced service providers.

4.3.2. Strengthen the prudence and oversight of the duty of care

The core of the duty of care, that is, the obligation to exercise due diligence, lies in directors making decisions based on a full grasp of related information. First of all, Directors need to carefully consider the rationality of introducing technologies such as large models and ensure that the selected models and their outputs are in line with the company's own interests and do not exceed their authority over Shareholders' decision-making rights, so as not to fall into a state of defective information acquisition. Second, Directors should build a compliance supervision system with governance as the core. Regularly perform classification, identification and continuous monitoring of the governance recommendations produced by models; promptly discover potential risks that could hurt the company's interests; At the same time, establish an efficient internal information feedback system [17]. At the same time, it is necessary to fully appreciate advantages and disadvantages of advanced high-risk artificial intelligence technology so as not to have excessively trustful feelings toward this new tool during application. If any particular problem occurs during the operation of this system, use it no more and take appropriate measures as soon as possible. Based on this, the connotation of the duty of diligence for company directors needs to be expanded in the Company Law to require them to protect both shareholders' long-term interests and the legitimate rights and interests of other stakeholders, as well as take measures against technological misuse.

4.3.3. Implement the requirements of "Responsible Algorithms" and ethics

"Responsible Algorithms" is an extension of the directors fulfilling their fiduciary obligations, and it necessitates that enterprises assume social responsibility. As well as building a regulatory system with external incentive and internal response as the main body, more attention should also be paid to the significance of outcome-oriented approach [18]. It is also necessary to evaluate the potential social effects before the application of technology and choose the most cautious plan. That is to say, it combines the social effects generated by the application of technology into corporate decisions; At the same time, incorporate algorithm supervision and ethical applications of technology within the scope of directors' fiduciary responsibilities. Acts that violate technological ethics can be considered a failure to meet fiduciary obligations. Therefore, the Company Law could introduce an ethical principle clause that explicitly prohibits directors from violating technological ethics, with explicit stipulations on the two duties of directors - one is the duty of loyalty to avoid "technology being fully controlled by capital", and the other is the duty of care to prevent technological abuse.

5. Conclusion

The deep integration of digital economic development and large model technology is profoundly altering the corporate power structure, decision-making mechanism, and governance system.

Starting from the structural impact of large models on corporate governance, this paper analyses the resulting imbalances in rights distribution, failure of supervision and vagueness of legal responsibility. Reflecting on the conceptual dilemmas in the current governance transformation, there are three dimensions: the limitations of traditional governance theory, rights conflicts under Coase's Theorem, and organizational inertia; At the same time, a practical new framework and adaptive solutions are constructed from multiple perspectives.

Looking ahead, with the continuous improvement of generative AI technology, it is expected that the rules governing corporate governance will become an open dynamic collaborative system combining synergy, empowerment and accountability. The scope of application of the Company Law should also be expanded to effectively regulate and manage new collaborative relations among people, machines and the environment. In this way, the companies can achieve technological innovation and restrain potential ethical misconduct and systematic risks to achieve the long-term unity of individual enterprise interests with those of society's public welfare.

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